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Eric S. Casiño
Hawai‘i Pacific University, United States
Abstract. The following is a reconstruction and expansion of a fifteen-minute presentation made in Davao 
City, Philippines, last 1–2 December 2011. The occasion was a roundtable discussion entitled “Undercurrents: 
Imagining a Post-Peace Agreement Period in Mindanao,” which was organized by the University of the 
Philippines Mindanao and its partners in peacebuilding research, Hiroshima University, Japan, and the South-
South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement (SSN). Incorporated in this update are responses to 
some comments made during the open forum. With the publication of the other papers, some redundancy 
might show up; but hopefully, because of such reemphasis, a fuller and more nuanced set of viewpoints and 
opinions will emerge to advance and implement the terms of peace in Mindanao long after the ink on the 
agreement documents has dried up.  
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The Iceberg Metaphor
I want to start my remarks on imagining the 
“Post-Peace Agreement Period” in Mindanao by 
suggesting the iceberg as a useful metaphor. You 
might recall here the iceberg in the film Titanic. 
You see a part of the iceberg above the ocean. But 
there is a much bigger part you do not see below 
the water, the part that, if you are not aware of, 
could surprise you with a shipwreck. Using this 
image in the context of the Philippines, the tip of 
the iceberg stands for the visible combatants from 
both sides of the conflict. The invisible parts below 
the surface are the broad expanse of publics and 
forces often forgotten that we need to bring into 
play if we are going to establish and maintain a 
healthy society in Mindanao. The outline of the 
iceberg above the water may also correspond 
to the visible Autonomous Region for Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) boundaries, but the iceberg’s 
invisible dimensions below the surface include 
the whole Mindanao and extend to the rest of the 
Philippines, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and 
to the international community. The issues of self-
determination and national sovereignty are ones 
that people all over the world are concerned about. 
No nation is an island unto itself.
 So what changes can we imagine for the social, 
political, and economic life of the multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural, multi-religious communities 
of Mindanao and Sulu, if and when the Moro 
rebellion is settled? That is my question. And 
my answer to this is as much “aspirational” as 
“futuristic imaginings.” I put them in quotation 
marks because the former implies personal 
aspiration to see things different from what they 
are. The “futuristic imaginings” are scenarios that 
may or may not correspond to a preferred future 
of any particular set of stakeholders. 
 Back to the hidden dimensions of the 
iceberg, the parts that we need to be aware of. 
They comprise several layers of stakeholders 
who want peace to prevail. So any imagining of 
B A N WA  Series A
2 Banwa 11A (2014/2015): Inv-001BANWA | ojs.upmin.edu.ph
OPEN ACCESS | PEER RE V IE WED
post-conflict Mindanao must bring into active 
involvement both the visible active combatants 
and the invisible publics, factors, and issues. We 
need to begin identifying especially these multiple 
layers of invisible stakeholders, nationally and 
internationally, because those who want peace and 
progress are not limited to people in the Philippines. 
Among these publics and sectors and trends that 
influence the conflict and the peace outcome 
we may include local government, business, 
education, agriculture, mining, environment, 
pollution, and the demographic forces driving 
rural and urban development. This is just a list of 
possible interest groups, but I do not intend to go 
through all of them here.  
 We already know who the visible combatants 
are: those from the government side and those 
from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 
the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG), and other fighters 
committed to changing the political relation of 
the Muslim communities with the Philippine state. 
But what or who are the invisible stakeholders, 
interest groups, and concerned citizens? Included 
among them are the families and communities 
inside and outside ARMM, local governments, 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), funding 
agencies, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID), the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)—particularly Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and international businesses and 
investors from Japan and the United States that 
have ongoing and future interests in Mindanao. 
The list can go on. All of them are in various 
degrees concerned stakeholders for future peace 
in Mindanao, interested in seeing Mindanao and 
Sulu transition into a healthy society.  
 Dr. Koki Seki of Hiroshima University, 
Japan, expanded on the meaning of the visible 
and invisible parts of the iceberg metaphor. His 
comments were most useful when he introduced 
related contrasts between the formal and informal, 
official and unofficial, dimensions of groups, 
factors, and issues. For instance, the conflicts 
between clans and dynastic political families, even 
within the ranks of Moro communities, are not 
seen as parts of the “official” rebellion; nevertheless 
such conflicts known as rido do affect the 
environment of peace and conflict in Mindanao. 
Those in clan wars may be considered invisible 
combatants. A good reference on rido is found in 
Torres (2007). Dr. Koki also introduced the quite 
commonplace tension between ethnolinguistic 
divides in the Philippines, apart from the binary 
opposition between Muslims and Christians. 
Another invisible or ignored factor is the fact 
that some Muslims do not want to be identified 
as Moros. In such a situation, some will ask, how 
viable then is the Bangsamoro construct? I have 
discussed elsewhere the general issues relating 
to levels of binary opposition of social categories 
in the Philippines; as well as the history of 
government policies towards indigenous peoples 
(Casiño 1987; Casiño 2011).  
 One point I wish to expand on is how the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) has 
unwittingly politicized the Lumads. IPRA allows 
Lumads to assert control over areas they claim as 
ancestral domains or ancestral lands. To strengthen 
these claims, they have to convert them into 
titles, known as certificate of ancestral domain 
title (CADT) and certificate of ancestral land title 
(CALT). Areas declared as ancestral domains 
and ancestral lands contain resources that have 
aroused the interest of the groups within the 
state and multi-national corporations engaged in 
mining, ranching, logging, and large agribusiness 
enterprises. Conflicts between these interests and 
the Lumads have occurred in the past, and the 
future relations will be problematical (Gaspar 
2000). Under IPRA and National Commission 
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) rules, such 
outside interests have to go through community 
gatekeepers who are the Lumad leaders. Now that 
is a formula for a potentially difficult situation. 
The gatekeepers may be enlightened, with a 
strong sense of inclusivity, who will look for the 
common good of their community. Or they may 
be ambitious, wanting to accumulate power within 
a narrow circle of followers, against the interest of 
the larger community. That is what I mean by IPRA 
politicizing the Lumad communities. Used wisely, 
IPRA can be a solution; but it can also be a tool for 
oppression. According to one legal anthropologist 
(Gaymaytan 2007), there are Lumads who refuse 
to resort to the IPRA statutes to resolve problems 
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of resource use and self-determination in their 
areas, to avoid being caught up in legal and political 
violent conflicts.
  Somewhat tangential to the comments Dr. 
Koki made is the changing nomenclature for what 
government agencies and NGOs use to described 
what they do. I have observed that there have 
been four terms that came in succession in terms 
of their popularity with people working with the 
poor and marginalized communities. First there 
was “modernization,” then came “development,” 
which was followed by “sustainability,” and now the 
new fashion is “inclusivity.” In the beginning, just 
after World War II, we pushed “modernization,” 
helping the Third World catch up with the West 
by getting them to modernize, modernize, and 
modernize. And then we shifted to the related 
concept of “development,” striving to develop 
this aspect and that aspect of society or culture. 
Later, people added the term “sustainability,” so 
that development was often paired as “sustainable 
development.” Because, of course, you do not just 
want to achieve a new benchmark in progress, but 
you must maintain and sustain the development. 
The last word, which I really like, is “inclusivity.” 
That means when we plan and work to improve 
things, we need to be more inclusive than we were 
in the past. So this idea of a tripartite conference 
organized by University of the Philippines 
Mindanao, the South-South Network for Non-
State Armed Group Engagement, and Hiroshima 
University is for me an excellent example of 
inclusivity in the search for peace and sustainable 
growth in Mindanao.
Imagining a New Mindanao
The Youth, Education, and Empowerment
 To imagine a peaceful Mindanao, we need 
improved education. Children in the affected 
communities will need special attention to help 
them catch up with those who are less affected. 
We imagine that more attention will be given to 
intensive training on inclusive citizenship, and on 
communal thinking that transcends religious and 
ethnic divisions.  
 Along this line, Mr. Mussolini Sinsuat Lidasan, 
director of the Al Qalam Institute for Islamic 
Identities and Dialogues in Southeast Asia, built 
up on the twin concepts of empowerment and 
the youth. He asked whether or not the discourse 
on the right to self-determination which the 
older Moro leadership has been promoting has 
trapped the youth from pursuing the more urgent 
cause of democratization and empowerment. He 
wondered how long we will remain trapped in this 
discourse, while we know that historically we had 
Muslim brothers from the Tausug, Maranao, and 
Maguindanao communities, as early as 1901, who 
joined the Philippine Senate and Congress, and 
served in the Cabinet. Moreover within the ranks 
of the Moros there are deep ethnic divisions, where 
some elements also want to separately exercise the 
right of self-determination, and so there seems 
to be no common ground. He preferred to focus 
on the issue of empowerment particularly of the 
youth, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. He cited 
the examples of the youth in Tunisia and Egypt. 
The youth there revolted against the status quo, in 
spite of the fact that these countries are Muslims. 
Thus power is actually in the hands of the people; 
the youth demonstrated to the world that they 
were free to exercise their power, to envision and 
construct a democratic society, different from 
the status quo. Lidasan’s view of the essence of 
empowerment is summed up in his final remark: 
“I don’t believe that our future is highly dependent 
on the output of the peace process. We, as a people, 
have our own power, and that power is within us. 
We have the option to choose what our future is, 
and we are not dependent mainly on what will 
happen to the GPH-MILF peace agreement.”  
 I agreed with the observation that the youth 
have power to change society. But I pointed 
out the difference between the Philippines and 
Tunisia. The revolution in Tunisia started with one 
young man who was brave enough to kill himself 
to express his defiance of the status quo. In the 
Philippine we do not have young people killing 
themselves to express their frustration, because 
there is room for young people to express different 
opinions. Still the youth are willing to sacrifice, as 
they did in the early battles of the MNLF against 
the government; and as they did in the days of 
student activism in the ’60s and ’70s when students 
faced death confronting the police and the military. 
What is needed is for the youth to come together 
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once again to form their own party, to empower 
themselves politically. But unless they do that, 
they will remain individual voices out there, not 
focused enough to change the status quo. And they 
should not wait for the existing parties in Manila, 
where some old people carry ideas in a mindset 
stuck in the last century. We need a new mindset 
of the youth, not just of the Moros, but all the 
young people in Mindanao. They have the power 
to change things, and not wait for the old people 
to tell them what to do—and how to do it.
 One factor that has a significant role in 
empowering the youth in the future Mindanao, as 
it did in the Arab Spring, is social media, as raised 
by Ms. Mitzi D. Austero, a local consultant of the 
international NGO Conciliation Resources. She 
pointed out that in the Philippines, there are 26 
million people on Facebook, although she does 
not know the number on Twitter or MySpace. 
The question was how the era of the Internet, free 
information, and social networking will impact our 
imagining of a post-peace agreement in Mindanao.
 How did the young people in Tunisia and 
Egypt challenge the status quo? Was it not through 
social media? So if they could do it, can the young 
people in the Philippines do the same, challenging 
the status quo? And who are the power-holders 
that need to be challenged? I would think the 
Commission on Election (COMELEC) is one of 
them.  
 There are lessons to learn from the youth 
movements in the Middle East. The other point is 
that this power of self-determination is not given to 
you; you don’t beg for it. You already have it in you; 
you just have to exercise it. The youth in Tunisia 
and Egypt have shown that they could exercise it. 
You don’t have to wait. You can exercise it as long 
as you are willing to pay the price. There is a price 
you pay to change any structure that is oppressive. 
It’s a painful price that some people were willing to 
pay in the past, and others doubtless will willingly 
pay again.
Business and Tourism 
 We imagine the rise of new leadership. The 
Mindanao of the future will see more participation 
from the women’s side. They will rise up as new 
models of political education and administrative 
leadership who will integrate the insights and 
inputs from women.  
 We imagine small and large businesses grow 
and expand, creating more jobs and absorbing 
people no longer engaged in fighting. Business will 
have a reciprocal effect with peace, because peace 
encourages the entry of new investors, and new 
businesses increases job opportunities. 
 We imagine an expansion of eco-tourism and 
cultural tourism. With better peace and security 
conditions, new and expanded tourist destination 
areas will flourish. People will not be afraid to travel 
in former conflict-affected areas. Infrastructure 
for travel and visitor facilities will be improved. 
Tourism is to be welcome as a counter-balance 
to environmental degradation that results from 
uncontrolled mining and large chemically-driven 
agribusiness enterprises. 
 One of the thorniest issues on the tip of the 
iceberg concerns the combatants. We imagine 
most of the soldiers and fighters from both 
sides will be out of jobs and will need to be 
productively employed elsewhere in society. This 
problem has been referred to as DDR—Disarm, 
Disband, Reintegrate. On the part of state 
militaries, we imagine their upkeep will be secured 
since they are part of the state’s standing army; 
however, their presence and numbers in Mindanao 
will be reduced. But the Citizen Armed Force 
Geographical Units (CAFGUs) will be disbanded, 
and their personnel will be absorbed in the regular 
labor sector. For those on the MILF side, their 
combatants will find employment in nonfighting 
jobs, integrated into the Philippine military, or 
remain in their fighting units as security forces. 
Finding funds for their upkeep will be a major 
problem. This situation is somewhat equivalent 
to downsizing in industries, where the solution is 
in retraining and placement in ongoing businesses 
or in self-employment in assisted programs, such 
as those supported by USAID.  
Governance and Leadership
 Finally, there needs to be a constitutional and 
governance reform of ARMM. This governance 
apparatus, as many of you know, has not been 
functioning very well. We need to identify 
weaknesses in its structure and operation, and we 
need to consult with key stakeholders, not just with 
the MILF leadership.  
 This new governance and leadership should 
recognize that the situation of non-Muslim 
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indigenous groups or Lumads will remain 
problematical. I consider the Lumad factor, 
inside and outside the boundaries of ARMM, 
to be a major political and demographic issue; 
they form a large part of the invisible part of the 
iceberg. The passage of IPRA and NCIP has so 
politicized the Lumads that even if the so-called 
Moro problem were settled tomorrow, the problem 
of the Lumads of Mindanao will continue to 
simmer. As we demobilize the Moro issue, there 
already is an increase of mobilization among the 
Lumads. The reason for this is that the provisions 
of IPRA have given a measure of veto power to the 
Lumad leadership over the entry and expansion 
of mining, commercial agriculture, and other 
extractive industries trying to operate within their 
ancestral domains. Thus the Mindanao leadership, 
and those of us in academe, need to expand our 
vision of what a peaceful Mindanao of our hopes 
and dreams will be like. We can continue to dream 
of the future, but we need to deal with reality now. 
And the Lumads are a large part of that unsettled 
but empowered reality just below our current 
horizon of preoccupation.  
 As Prof. Yusuf Morales of the Institute for 
Comparative and Advanced Studies (ICAS), 
reminded the delegates of the conference, while 
the MILF is negotiating with the Philippine 
government, a new formation of individuals from 
Sulu has decided to resurrect their traditional 
political ideas, not to the extent of going back to the 
Sulu Sultanate, but to separate themselves from the 
politics of the Mindanao mainland. He wondered 
how the MILF would respond if representatives 
of these Sulu-oriented groups from Basilan, Tawi-
Tawi, Palawan, and North Borneo could speak at 
the negotiating table and declare they wanted out. 
 I addressed this question by recalling that 
Marcos’s implementation of the Tripoli Agreement 
was to create two regions of autonomy, one Sulu-
centered, and the other Mindanao-centered. 
When Cory Aquino took over from Marcos, she 
consolidated the two to form the current ARMM 
autonomous government. So prior to ARMM 
there were in fact two parallel tracks to autonomy. 
The Sulu-centric sentiments of groups wanting 
their own region of autonomy, I believe, will still 
persist, as manifested by some Tausug elements 
asserting their right to self-determination. 
Historically, the Sulu Sultanate was a feudal and 
nondemocratic state, holding together a cluster 
of smaller segmentary power centers, successfully 
maintaining itself against British, Dutch, and 
Spanish attempts to conquer it. But whether the 
Sulu zone and its traditional power centers can 
again achieve self-determination in the twenty-first 
century remains to be seen.
 This key question of viability of new states 
was raised by Prof. Osamu Yoshida of Hiroshima 
University, Japan, who also pointed out the related 
question of political education. On the viability of 
new states, I only pointed out that not all of them 
achieved independence through the exercise of 
the right to self-determination in wars of national 
liberation. The case of Singapore is a good example, 
because it did not seek to be an independent 
nation-state; it was pushed to become one by the 
Federation of Malaysia.
 On political education, Prof. Yoshida pointed 
out that there is much controversy on content and 
who should determine it. It is a very controversial 
issue, especially in East Asia where it is considered 
part of interpreting and propagating a nation’s 
history. In the Philippines, there is a similar 
controversy over content, such as remembering 
the abuses during martial law under the Marcos 
dictatorship. Possible contents for political 
education in Mindanao are found in some recent 
and not so recent attempts at reconstructing the 
cultural and political history of the Moros and the 
Lumads (cf. Gowing 1977; Warren 1985; McCoy 
1993; Turner et al. 1992; McKenna 1998; Jubair 
1999; Abinales 2010; Gaspar 2000; Casiño 2000; 
Casiño 2011). 
 As to who should determine the content, I 
believe the state should not be the sole authority 
or propagator of it. In my observation, during the 
years of student activism, students themselves 
determined the content and actively propagated 
them in seminars and sit-ins. Politically subversive 
ideas were circulating not inside universities 
through textbooks, but by word of mouth, in 
debates, seminars, and exchanges in these sit-ins. 
Through such circulation of ideas, the young 
people became more deeply aware of the status 
quo and how they could and should change it. 
And I believe this was what happened in Tunisia 
and Egypt, with students communicating through 
social media rather than sit-ins. The rise of 
revolutionary ideas reached such a level that the 
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central government could no longer stop it, could 
not stop the arrival of the Arab Spring. I imagine 
in the Philippines, and particularly for the situation 
in Mindanao, a new political education will reach a 
point that the young people will make a difference 
in changing the status quo. And it is up to us to 
imagine and determine what that difference will 
be like, when our own Mindanao Spring arrives. 
 Expounding back on the Lumad issue, Ms. 
Lualhati M. Abreu, a freelance researcher work and 
writing for NGOs in Metro Manila and Mindanao, 
reported that indigenous peoples (IPs) in north 
and southeastern Mindanao, particularly the 
Ata Manobo, have been politicized by NDF. The 
relationship between the two was the reverse of 
the typology presented at the conference. There 
the people’s organizations were the visible forces, 
the public combatants, with the NDF helping them 
off the side. It was a Manobo organization that 
launched a pangayaw against loggers. The IPs in 
turn have supported the movement for almost fifty 
years. With the help of some church groups, the IPs 
have started their own school and some economic 
projects. She dreams of peace with her question: 
“What if the government will sign with the NDF 
the fast-track proposal that the NDF is suggesting? 
Give them the right to develop their areas, just as 
GPH would give the MILF the chance to develop 
their areas . . . magiging peaceful sa Mindanao 
[Mindanao will become peaceful].”
 My own brief comment was that we need to 
constantly remind ourselves that there are parallel 
conflict and peace processes, one with the MILF, 
the other with the communist side. When we talk 
about peace in Mindanao, we cannot limit it to the 
GRP-MILF peace process. We cannot forget that 
there is that other conflict going on in the other 
half of Mindanao. And it involves very much the 
IPs more than the Moros. And so the dreaming of 
a peaceful Mindanao of the future must include all 
Mindanaoans. 
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